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Subject:

Meeting with GOT MFA Diria 9/8/92

1.
In his discussion with the French, Belgian and U.S. observers the morning
of September 8, Tanzanian Foreign Mini~ter Diria made the following points:
--The RPF proposal for a "super-commission," i.e., a political body composed
jointly of representatives of the current GOR and the RPF, having broad
executive and legislative powers, would duplicate the roles envisioned for the
JPMC and most likely prove unacceptable to the GOR.
--It is necessary to keep the GOR and the constitution in place through a
transition to ensure the internal security and administration of the country.
Substantial modifications and amendments to bring about RPF participation
would be needed, but not the cost of creating conflicting authorities.
--The negotiators, together with the facilitator and the observers,
able to look at a variety of models for power-sharing arrangements.

must

be

--In the private consultations following the opening day's plenary, Diria
had asked both parties to provide positions and proposals in writing, and had
asked the African observers to provide a paper as well. These papers would
serve as the basis for discussion during the afternoon's plenary; he hoped it
would be possible to produce from them a single working document. The object
of the exercise was to encourage the parties to focus on their specific goals,
and the processes needed to achieve them.
--Diria also emphasized to the parties the need to avoid inflammatory public
statements, and asked that both agree to limit their public comments to joint
statements to be issued by a single spokesman.
2.
Diria felt that the observers and the facilitator should encourage the RPF
to pursue its goals through the agreed mechanisms of the JPMC and through
participation in existing structures.
The GOT, as fallback positions, would
recommend consideration of mechanisms such as those employed in South Africa
or Congo-Brazzaville, e.g., a special commission with advisory powers to
recommend constitutional and legislative changes, or a commission of eminent
but neutral Rwandans from the clergy or the judiciary with limited legislative
powers to amend the constitution.
3. Referring to the RPF concerns expressed by Pasteur Bizimungu during the
opening round regarding continuing violence in Rwanda, Diria said that he had
urged the RPF to take their complaints to the JPMC.
He feared that raising
these concerns, however legitimate, in the context of the power-sharing
negotiations threatened to distract from the focus of the talks. He added
that he has asked the OAU to get the JPMC up and running and dealing with
these problems as a confidence-building measure.

Session Sept. 9.

1. Plenary session open 5 PM under sharmanship of Prin Sec. of each negotiator
on document presenteeby the other. For Min Diria returned evenening sept 9
and held long conversations with each side.
2. Minister Ngulinziraraised several questions regarding difference between
apparent flexibility in Biz~ungu's opening remarks and closed maximalist
position of RPF paper, namely:
Did RPF intend to maintain existing state institutions or dissolve them;
Did CNr with its limited membership and extensive powers represent a force for
national unity and reconciliation;
Did RPf wantto amend the constitution or substite a new one for it.
Did RPF want to clean up the administration ofdismiss all personnel.
existing
constitution
3. In return, Commissioner Bizingu asserted taht
consecrated he coup of 1973 and the dictatorship of Habyar~ana. The present
Article 5 of
constitution does not forsee power sharing and must be scraped.
the governments proposal is a mockery and an abdication of government's
negotiating role. On the other hand, article 6 8, and 9 in the proposal had
some merit.
But on balance, he saw nothing in the governments proposal that
hinted of sharing power.
4. Minister Diria convoked Rawson near midnight September· 9 to review his
impressions of where things stood and to seek Rawson's advice. Diria found
the government displaying some flexiblity but the RPF not moving from their
position.
He asked that the USG contact RPF Chairman Kanyarengwe and inform
h~ that the RPF proposal cannot
be accepted by the government because it
abrogates all power to a self appointed committee and replaced a constitution
sanctioned by popular referendum with a document drafted by RPF hierarchy.
The
proposal
concentrates
all
power
in
the National Committee for
Reconciliation, strips away the legal basis for guaranteeing rights of people
and authorityof institutions and pushes back the democratic process for four
years. He urged that Kanyarengwe have his negotiators look for other ways to
achieve their objectives of a state that is secure for all and a democratic
society free of sectarianism. Rawson urged the Foreign Minister to get senior
people from each side talking to each other in closed sessions to try to
hammer out points of common agreement which could get the negotiations started
down the right track.
5 Plenary reopened September 10 to hear long observations by Nkulinzira on RPF
document. His comments clarified the government position of power sharing and
opened the door to constitutional change through legal channels. RPF demanded
one day to prepare a reply.
Meanwhile senior people form each side are
meeting with OAU and facilitator to set forth areas of agreement in unified
working document.

Sept. 11.
1. Plenary opened with Commissioner B~zLmungu responding to Foreign Minister's
statements of previous day.
The commissioner"s statement was a detailed and
at tLmes Lmpassioned defense of RPF goals: to gain respect for fundamental
liberties, to put an end to oppression under the MRND government and to
establish democratic rule. He again asserted that MRND regime concentrates in
its
hands the presidency, administration, constitution and most of the
government. The RPF wanted the end of the party-state and to lift the heavy
hand of MRND rule from institutions of state. In brief it wanted to share
MNRD power not just power within the government, narowly defined.
2. The old order must change, Bizimungu asserted.
The transition is from
dictatorship to democracy.
Its tasks are to elaborate a new constitution,
install displaced persons back in their homes, reintegrate Rwandese refugees
and then have free, transparent and fair· elections, which, Bizimungu claimed,
Rwanda has not expereinc.ed since 1973. This takes time and the RPF did not
think that 36 months from the establishment of the institutions of the interim
government was excessive.
3. The transition must also insure security--this is indispensable for a civil
society to which refugees can return.
The MRND regime is determined to
maintain insecurity. Bizimungu then quoted from tracts of various Rwandan
human rights groups against the regime. The MRND attitude and actions make it
impossible to consider power legitimate in Rwanda until elections change the
regime.
4.
Bizimungu cited three reason to abrogate the constitution: Articles 101,
50, and 55 are against power-sharing in a transitional government; the
presidential powers enumerated therein give the preoative of overturning any
accord which RPF might sign with the government and the constitution does not
really protect individual rights--he cited the legal limits of freedom of

movement as defined in Article 21) .
must either be suspended or amended.

Bizimungu concluded that the constitution

5. Some institutions should be suppressed, Bizimungu claimed, because they
represented power that could not be shared.
This included the CND, the
Council of State, and the Constitutional Court.
The latter two did not
function properly because they were staffed with untrained hacks nominated by
the President.
6. In a brief reply, the Foreign Minister reported on investigations now under
way in Kibungu and on Rwanda's efforts to get an international committee to
investigate human rights violations during the war period.
The Minister of
Justice has now invited Amnesty International to Rwanda and the foreign
Minister hoped that other international groups would join them.
He then
presented a rather studious defense of Article 21 based on its origins in the
international pact on civil and political rights.
7. The last hour of plenary was devoted to an introduction of the combined
working document which the high-level drafting committee had worked out
yesterday.
This occasioned a heated exchange on the meaning of power in the
title. The facilitator stopped the debate and had OAU's Mapuranga explain how
the document was put together and delineate areas of agreement as well as
areas for negotiation. After five days of rhetorical exchanges and lengthy
breaks to translate yet another paper, the negotiators finally have in front
of them a clear agenda for negotiation.
There was no indication in this
evening's work that the sides are any closer together but seeing their
postitions collated in one document makes one feel that agreement
may
eventually be possible.

September 12
1.
Fonmin Diria convoked the . observers for a conclave before the first
plenary session to discuss the position of the two sides, the appropriate role
for the observers and the facilitator, and whether the observers shared a
common position on what would constitute a fair settlement.
Most of the
observers agreed that the two sides remained far apart in their views on the
nature of power-sharing.
They also agreed that the
GOR
was
showing
considerable flexibility in offering to try to accomodate RPF concerns with
the exisiting state structures, but that it could not accede to the RPF's
demand for power-sharing arrangements that would effectively displace the
current government. The Ugandan observer, for example, noted that the RPF
demand to exclude the MRND from its proposed supreme council was untenable.
OAU rep Mapuranga, however, noted that the for.mulation of a "Broad-based
Transitional Government" (BBTG) was the RPF's, and that it might be possible
to move beyond the discussion of the meaning of power-sharing to negotiations
about changes in specific institutions.
US rep Rawson noted that the JPMC
remained available as an agreed transitional authority with a broad mandate
that could address many of the RPF's concerns. The consensus coming out of
this meeting
was
that
the
observers
should
continue
to
play
a
behind-the-scenes role to try to move the RPF and the GOR towards discussion
of the specific changes needed in exisiting institutions to meet the RPF's
concerns.
The Plenary
2.
The plenary, however, did not follow the proposed track. Although Diria
(assisted by Mapuranga, who was to play a more active role at Diria's right
hand as his "assistant chairman") opened with a proposal that the two sides
move to a discussion of specifics rather than debating a statement of
principle, both the RPF and GOR delegations continued to argue over the scope
and
definition
of
power-sharing.
Diria, frustrated, launched into a
stupefying and largely incoherent harangue, primarily at the the RPF, in which
he accused them of backing away from commitments undertaken in the Rule of Law
document agreed to at Arusha II. This was followed by a tenditious exchange
between the RPF and the GOR over whether they were discussing power-sharing
between the current government and the RPF or power-sharing as feature of the
separate branches of government, with the RPF accusing the government of
confusing the issues. Mapuranga, following all this, pointed out that the two
parties seemed to agree at least that power-sharing between the RPF and the
government had to extend beyond the executive, to legislative and local
authorities.
Diria, perhaps thinking there was more agreement than in fact
was the case, intervened with a proposed amendment to the working document
specifying that power-sharing was understood to mean power-sharing in the
executive, legislative and judiciary, at the the central and local levels; but
also that the three branches of government should remain separate. The RPF
saw an opening in this formulation and accepted it; the GOR, however, rewrote
it into a restatement of its prior position; i.e., that power-sharing meant
power-sharing in the executive, with the government being willing to enact
reforms that would enable the RPF to participate in other institutions. The
RPF
rejected
the
GOR
reformulation.

French Position
4.
The French observers stated their ~iew that only way to change structures
and people was through elections·. . The GOR would not accept the RPF's ideas
about
a
supra-governmental
council.
The RPF should be encouraged to
participate broadly in existing structures, including the JPMC.
Their final
concern was that any transitional period leading to elections be kept short; a
long inter~ period would create uncertainties that could exacerbate internal
tensions.
The French noted, parenthetically, that the GoR team had said they
were "willing to budge" on Article 101 of the Constitution, which mandates
that the President and the Council of Deputies continue in power until new
elections are held.
The Belgians
5. The Belgian observer agreed with the need to encourage the RPF to work
within the existing framework, and suggested that if agreement were not
reached in this round, a working group of the two parties be ·created to
continue discussions in Kigali to further define what changes in the current
system are required.

secstate and kigali, immediate
info usual suspects

Subject:

Arusha III:

Progress over the Weekend

1. Summary. The single working document created September 10-11 served as
the basis of discussion at the plenary on September 12.
The two sides
~ediately deadlocked over the scope and meaning of
power-sharing.
Following
private meetings with the observers, the RPF delegation decided to give some
ground on the formulation of power-sharing and move to a discussion of
·specific institutions and mechanisms that would meet their concern.
On
September 13 the RPF and GOR delegations agreed on compromise language on
power-sharing and started to take up the mechanisms of RPF participation in
the institutions of the transitional government. End Summary.

Power-Sharing:

Deadlock •..

2.
At a meeting before the opening of the September 12 plenary, Tanzanian
Fonmin Diria and the observer delegations agreed that the two sides remained
divided over the definition and scope of power-sharing. The consensus was
that that the GOR was showing considerable flexibility but that it could not
accept the RPF's demand for power-sharing arrangements that would override the
existing constitution and government. The observers agreed to work with both
sides to try to move towards discussions of how the RPF's needs could be
accomodated within the framework of existing institutions, including the
JPMC.
3. At the plenary, the RPF proposed an amendment to Article One of the
working document to define power-sharing during a transitional regime as
including all the institutions of the state. The government balked at such a
sweeping definition, instead offering language that limited power-sharing to
the government (narrowly defined as the executive branch and cabinet) but
offering to consider reforms to other institutions such as the legislature and
judiciary that would enable the RPF to participate with the other parties in
managing
the transition.
Several attempts to find compromise language,
including interventions by FonMin Diria and OUA Rep Mapuranga, failed to break
the impasse.
The RPF was concerned that the GOR formulation would leave the
broad powers of the Presidency intact and leave them with no recourse if the
GOR reneged or the transition process went awry. The plenary adjourned with
the two sides still far apart. The one note of hope:
the two sides agreed
that the original drafting committee (which had produced the working paper)
would sit down with OAU Rep Mapuranga and try to find a compromise formula.

... then Compromise
4. Following t.he plenary, US Rep Rawson met privately with RPF delegation
head Bizimungu and Patrick Maz±mhaka. He urged that the RPF move beyond the
discussion of the general
statement
on
power-sharing
and
focus
on
institutions.
US Rep noted that the GOR offer of reforms to include the RPF
was a potentially significant concession; the opportunity to negotiate the
scope of these reforms should not be missed. In additional discussions with
GOR Fonmin Ngulinzira and the facilitator, Fonmin Diria, US Rep emphasized
that the GOR had to start making specific offers on institutional changes that
would meet the RPF's concerns.
5. Before the September 13 plenary Mapuranga advised us that the two sides
appeared ready to agree on a compromise for.mula on power-sharing. RPF rep
Bizimungu told US Rep that the RPF had decided to try the tack we had
suggested.
At the opening of the plenary, the two sides assented to the
following formulation:
Article One: The two parties reaffirm their acceptance of the principle of
power-sharing within the framework of a broad-based transitional government in
conformity with Article Five of the N'sele Ceasefire Agreement as amended at
Gbadolite on 16 September, 1991 and at Arusha on 12 July, 1992 the modalities
of ~plementation of which principle are the object of this Protocol of
Agreement.
Article Two:
consist of:

In

that

connection,

the two parties agree that the modalities

a) Maintenance of the present structures of the coalition government with
appropriate adjustments to be mutually agreed upon in this protocol with a
view to making room for the participation of the RPF and other political
forces in the country;
b)
Appropriate adjustments mutually agreed upon in this protocol to be
carried out at the level of the state's powers with a view to allowing the RPF
and other political forces in the country to participate, make for the
efficient management of the transition and in respect of the principle of the
separation of powers.
6.
Following this advance, the plenary nearly bogged down again when the RPF
proposed to skip over the next section of the working document, which deals
with the functions of the transitional government, and move directly to a
discussion of institutions. The GOR delegation wanted to agree on a common
program for the transition before discussing institutions. The RPF insisted
that as the talks were about power-sharing, it wanted to get to
the
institutional questions.
Fonmin Diria pointed out that the parties were not
committed to follow the working document clause by clause; they were free to
take its sections in any order they agreed on. The GOR side accepted the
RPF' s proposal, but stated that it t-1ished to first discuss the "broad-based
transitional government," i.e., the executive and the cabinet. in a brief
exchange between the heads of the delegations, the two sides decided to
adjourn so they could consult directly together in an informal setting, and
the plenary adjourned until September 14 on this positive note.

secstate immediate
kigali immediate
info usual suspects (make sure bonn and brussels included)

subject:

arusha III:

the gor makes an offer

1. summary. During the september 14 plenary sessions, the parties adopted a
draft program for the transitional government. After some initial confusion,
the GOR was then persuaded to present its offer on power-sharing in all
branches of governmen as a single package. The RPF provided its comments and
some counterproposals; a more for.mal response has been delayed until a plenary
session now planned for this evening (september 15). end summary.
2.
Before discussing power-sharing arrangements, fonmin Diria first asked the
parties to adopt a program for the transitional government.
During discussion
of the program, RPF delegation head Bizimungu again indicated that he wanted
to move the negotiations directly into power-sharing.
The GOR was willing,
but Diria, as chairman,. refused to move until the two parties adopted the
draft program. The RPF requested some clarifications; both sides then agreed
to adopt the program as yet another working document.
3.
GOR Fonmin Ngulinzira then called for proposals on power-sharing from the
RPF. He said that his government had prepared proposals but were unaware of
any from the RPF side.
He added that if the RPF needed more t~e, he was
willing to adjourn the talks for several days to let them consult.
This idea
produced an immediate uproar in the plenary, with the facilitators and
observers huddling with the two delegations to urge them to continue. It
became apparent the the RPF wanted to discuss power-sharing in the separate
branches of government as a package; i.e., they wanted to see the government's
entire offer. The GOR initially appeared to be unwilling to proceed this way,
but ult~ately relented.

4.
Insisting that the transitional government should .govern within the
framework of existing laws to ensure "the continuity of state institutions, ..
fonmin ngulinzira off~red the following:
--a constitutional amendment providing that the peace agreement's provisons
would prevail in any conflict with existing legislation or the current
constitution (US Rep Rawson had suggested this approach to Ngulinzira before
the plenary) ;
--President Habyarimana would retain office, but all
would be taken only with the concurrence of the Cabinet;

Presidential

actions

--The RPF would join the cabinet, and would negotiate its share of portfolios
directly with the other political parties;
--The Cabinet would make decisions by consensus;
--The Government would be open to all the parties that subscribe
agreement;
--The ministers would remain
Minister to the President;

to

the

peace

accountable to the Prime Minister and the Prime

--The existing legislature would be replaced by a new Transitional National
Assembly (TNA), which would last through the transition period and include
members elected
from
within
Rwanda
on
the
basis
of
proportional
representation.
The RPF would be able to nominate a number of members, as the
assembly would be elected before the return of refugees;
--The TNA would enact legislation by majority vote in routine matters.
In
sensitive areas to be determined in the peace agreement, a three-fifths
majority would be required. The RPF, in addition, would be given a veto in
matters touching on the peace agreement.
--The existing judiciary would remain for the most part. The State Security
Council would be abolished. A Court of Accounts would be created as an arm of
the TNA to monitor the Treasury. A Supreme constitutional court would review
legislation. The Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) would propose to
the Supreme Court candidates for judicial appointments.

--The BBTG would create a number of special commissions to deal with National
Unity and Reconciliation, Public Security, Infor.mation and Education, Refugee
Problems, the Constit~tion and the. preparations for General Elections at the
end of the transition period.
"Les jeux sent fait," concluded minister Ngulinzira.
give the RPF time to prepare its response.

The plenary

adjourned

to

5.
When the plenary reconvened that evening, RPF delegation chief Bizimungu
stated that the RPF accepted the government's proposal as a basis for
discussion. He raised questions about the GOR stating that the transitional
government would operate within existing laws, but also that the peace
agreement would have primacy.
He remarked sarcastically that the present
conflict was not provided for in existing legislation.
He accepted that the
agreement should be supreme, but existing laws and constitutional provisions
that contradicted it should be changed. He did not think that the GOR had
made clear the effect of its proposals on the President's powers. The RPF
accepted Habyarimana as the incumbent President but wanted him stripped of
effective power.
On forming a BBTG,, the RPF was ready to discuss portfolios
with the political parties, but thought that was what it had come to Arusha to
do with the GOR. Did the GOR delegation not represent the coalition parties,
Bizimungu asked. Nor did the RPF really understand the proposal for the TNA.
It accepted the idea, but was uncomfortable with the notion of nominated RPF
members (alone of all the parties) and an RPF veto, feeling that these
measures would tend to isolate the RPF politically.
6.

The RPF then provided counterproposals:

--As the incumbent President is head of the MRND party, two additional
co-presidents should be provided, one by the RPF and one by the opposition
coalition;
--The
executive
powers
proposed
for the RPF's Committee
Reconciliation would be transferred to the Tripartite Presidency;

of

National

--In the BBTG, the Prime Minister would be provided by one of the current
opposition parties (MDR, PL or PSD), but not the same party as the opposition
co-president. The RPF would be given the post of Vice Prime Minister, who
would also hold another ministerial portfolio;
--The RPF proposed a TNA of 40 members, all nominated instead of elected.
Each of the major parties -- MRND, MDR, PL, PSD and the RPF
would nominate
6 members.
Five more would be nominated by the existing Associations for the
Defense of Human Rights and the last five from "other political forces,"
provided that none came from existing MRND mass organizations;

--For the judiciary, the RPF referred to its charter language, where a Supreme
Council of Justice, elected by the judiciary itself, would preside over the
judiciary;
--The RPF accepted the GOR proposal for Commissions, but felt they should be
under and responsive to the TNA.
The RPF also argued that the current constitution was so fatally flawed that
it should be replaced by its own draft Transition Charter as an appendix to
the peace agreement.
It claimed that current legislation "maintained the
environment" of the single-party system and thus needed to be revised.
7.
In the following discussion, emphasizing its desire for strong protections
for basic rights and the principle of equal access without quotas or special
treatment.
The GOR in turn, asked the RPF to propose the amendments and
changes it thought were needed. During a break for private consultations, the
RPF heard from most of the observers, including the US, that the idea of a
tripartite presidency was probably unworkable and would not fly.
The GOR
emphasized its willingness to be flexible and to consider any proposals or
changes the RPF wished to. suggest. Ngulinzira emphasized that he spoke for
·the
coalition
government and the political parties.
The plenary then
adjourned with the RPF promising to present modified proposals the following
day (September 15) .
8.
As we write this, we understand that the RPF has requested a delay until
five p.m. this afternoon to prepare its proposals.
Consensus among the
observers is that the GOR has gone some distance towards meeting the concerns
of the RPF, but that the RPF has been somewhat slow to fully grasp the
implications of the GOR's offer
legal primacy for the peace agreement,
cabinet control of the Presidency, a new legislature with an RPF veto, and a
role in judicial appointments.
The GOR approaches the resolution of the
conflict as·a matter of including the RPF in a process of democratic refor.m;
the RPF evidently feels that it must establish the outcome of the refor.m
process in the peace agreement.

